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CANADA/UNITED STATES  
MILITARY INTEROPERABILITY AND 
HUMANITARIAN LAW ISSUES: LAND MINES, 
TERRORISM, MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND 
TARGETED KILLING 
COLONEL KENNETH WATKIN* 
Our nations play independent roles in the world, yet our purposes 
are complementary. We have important work ahead. . . .  The first 
great commitment is to defend our security and spread freedom by 
building effective multinational and multilateral institutions and sup-
porting effective multilateral action. 
President George Bush1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The post 9/11 period has the appearance of being a particularly 
divisive one for practitioners of international humanitarian law.  Con-
troversies have surrounded the prosecution of “war” against terror-
ism; coalition operations in Iraq; and the categorization and treat-
ment of detainees.  The conduct of military operations at the 
commencement of the 21st century has also shone a bright spotlight on 
traditional tensions in humanitarian law, such as the application of 
that law to conflicts between state and non-state actors.2  A particu-
 
Copyright © 2005 by Colonel Kenneth Watkin 
 * Colonel Kenneth Watkin is the Deputy Judge Advocate General/Operations for the 
Canadian Forces. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not nec-
essarily reflect the views of the Government of Canada, the Canadian Forces, or the Office of 
the Judge Advocate General. This commentary is based on a presentation given at the U.S.-
Canadian Security Relations: Partnership or Predicament? Conference sponsored by the Center 
on Law, Ethics and National Security, Duke University, April 2004.  
 1. Speech given at Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada (Dec. 1, 2004), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2004/12/20041201-4.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
 2. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 165-67 (2d ed. 
2004). 
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larly difficult issue has been the categorization of the armed conflict 
against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.3 
There has also been the challenge of determining what humani-
tarian law should be applied.  The United States has not ratified Ad-
ditional Protocol I,4 although it does accept that a portion of its provi-
sions are reflective of customary international law.5  Further, many of 
the main protagonists in the post 9/11 conflicts have not ratified that 
Protocol.6  As a result there has sometimes been reliance, perhaps too 
heavily, on Additional Protocol I as a source of binding positive law 
in respect of the campaign on terrorism.7 
 
 3. See Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in 
Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 1, 2-6 (2004) (outlining various legal bases for 
the conflict in Afghanistan). 
 4. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
 5. For discussion of the U.S. treatment of Additional Protocol I, see W. Hays. Parks, Air 
War and the Law of War, 31 A.F. L. REV.1, 218-24 (1990); Abraham D. Sofaer, Agora: The U.S. 
Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims 
(Cont’d), The Rationale for the United States Decision, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 784 (1988); Letter of 
Transmittal, Agora: The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the 
Protection of War Victims, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 910, 910-12 (1987); Hans-Peter Gasser, Agora: The 
U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Vic-
tims, An Appeal for Ratification by the United States, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 912 (1987); and Douglas 
J. Feith, Protocol I: Moving Humanitarian Law Backwards, 19 AKRON L. REV. 531 (1986).  See 
also George S. Prugh, American Issues and Friendly Reservations Regarding Protocol I, Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions, 31 THE MIL. L. AND L. OF WAR. REV. 225 (1992); George Al-
drich, Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (1991) (stating that State Department Deputy Legal Adviser 
Michael J. Matheson “indicated various provisions of the Protocol that the administration sup-
ported and considered as either existing customary international or appropriate to become cus-
tomary international law and contrasted them with certain other provisions that the administra-
tion opposed”); Christopher Greenwood, Terrorism and Humanitarian Law—The Debate Over 
Additional Protocol I, 19 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 187, 190-91, 200-01 (1989) (discussing the Reagan 
administration’s criticisms of Protocol I); and Theodor Meron, Comment, The Time Has Come 
for the United States to Ratify Geneva Protocol I, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 678, 680 (1994) (stating that 
“the Reagan administration hoped that it could benefit from the Protocol’s clearer articulation 
of customary law and desirable new developments, while rejecting the rest of the package”). 
 6. Neither the United States, Afghanistan nor Iraq have ratified Additional Protocol I. 
 7. Adam Roberts notes that the International Committee of the Red Cross struggled with 
the classification of the armed conflict in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks.  Their initial 
communications to national governments put “less reliance on binding treaty law than on provi-
sions of 1977 Geneva Protocol I, to which neither the US nor Afghanistan was a party, and not 
all of the provisions of which that were cited can plausibly be claimed to be ‘recognized as bind-
ing on any Party to an armed conflict.’”  HOUSE OF COMMONS DEF. COMM., Minutes of Evi-
dence Appendix 9 (Dec. 2002) (supplementary memorandum by Sir Adam Roberts), available 
at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmdfence/93/93ap10.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
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It is not clear to what degree the present debate on the recogni-
tion of “unlawful combatants” under international law has been im-
pacted by what may be too literal an interpretation of Additional Pro-
tocol I.  Strict interpretations of that Protocol appear to divide 
populations into only two distinct categories: lawful combatants and 
civilians.8  In contrast, non-Protocol I-based interpretations do not in-
clude unlawful combatants or unprivileged belligerents9 as innocent 
“civilians”.10  For example, the United States government appears to 
have grouped both lawful and unlawful combatants into one broader 
category of “enemy combatants,” relying heavily on cases such as Ex 
Parte Quirin.11  Canada has acknowledged that “unlawful combat-
ants” exist as a category of participants in hostilities.12  These unprivi-
leged belligerents13 would include civilians who take a direct part in 
hostilities, mercenaries and spies, all of whom are recognized under 
Additional Protocol I.14  While different approaches to interpreting 
 
 8. However, Additional Protocol I, supra note 5, at art. 45(3), does make reference to 
“[a]ny person who has taken part in hostilities, who is not entitled to prisoner-of-war status. . . .” 
 9. See Watkin, supra note 4, at 6-8, for a discussion of the wide range of persons who 
might be considered “unprivileged belligerents” or “unlawful combatants.” 
 10. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 29 (2004) (“[H]e cannot claim the privileges appertaining 
to lawful combatancy.  Nor can he enjoy the benefits of civilian status. . . .”). 
 11. 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 1, 2, 8-12 (2004) (using the 
terms “enemy combatants,” “lawful combatants” and “unlawful combatants”).  For discussion 
of combatants in non-U.S. decisions, see generally United States v. List (Hostage Case), 11 
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER 
COUNCIL CONTROL LAW NO. 1 at 1, 450 (1950); Public Prosecutor v. Koi, [1968] A.C. 829 (P.C. 
1967) (appeal taken from Koi); Mohammed Ali v. Public Prosecutor [1969] 1 A.C. 430 (P.C. 
1968) (appeal taken from Ali); and Military Prosecutor v. Omar Mahmud Kassem and Others, 
42 I.L.R. 470 (Isr. Mil. Ct. at Ramallah, 1969). 
 12. See Kirby Abbott, “Terrorists: Criminals, Combatants or. . . .?” The Question of Com-
batancy, in CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INT’L LAW, THE MEASURES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
EFFECTIVENESS, FAIRNESS AND VALIDITY 366, 381 (2004) (outlining the Canadian govern-
ment’s acknowledgement of the concept of unlawful combatant in a statement presented by the 
Associate Deputy Minister, James Wright, before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade). 
 13. See Richard R. Baxter, So-called ‘Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies, Guerrillas, and 
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 323, 328 (1951) (Unprivileged belligerents are defined as “per-
sons who are not entitled to treatment either as peaceful civilians or as prisoners of war by rea-
son of the fact that they have engaged in hostile conduct without meeting the qualifications es-
tablished by Article 4 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1949.”). 
 14. See OFF. OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, CANADIAN NAT’L DEF. JOINT 
DOCTRINE MANUAL, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL 
LEVELS [B-GJ-005-104/FP-021] paras. 318-320, at 3-5, 3-6 (Aug. 13, 2001) available at 
http://www.dcds.forces.ca/ jointDoc/docs/LOAC_e.pdf  (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter 
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVEL MANUAL] (designating civilians engaged in hostilities 
and spies as unlawful hostilities). 
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the law have not precluded the development of broad military coali-
tions involving European states, the United States, Canada and other 
countries, the opportunity for legal debate and potential disagree-
ment has remained. 
Further, the interpretation of humanitarian law appears at times 
to have been impacted by an undercurrent of political, ideological, 
strategic and jurisprudential differences between Europe and the 
United States.15  There is also the effect that different international 
analytical approaches may have on the interpretation of humanitarian 
law.16  This apparent European/United States divisiveness often 
places Canada in a challenging position.  Geographically positioned 
as a close neighbour it still retains, in historical, cultural and legal 
terms, close links to Europe and, in particular, the United Kingdom 
and France.17  In some respects it might be argued that Canada is 
 
 15. See, e.g., ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE 
NEW WORLD ORDER 3 (2003): 
Europe is turning away from power. . .into a self-contained world of laws and rules and 
transnational negotiation and cooperation. . . .  Meanwhile the United States remains 
mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international 
laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defence and promotion 
of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. 
See also JOSEPH S. NYE JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD’S ONLY 
SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE 29-35 (2002) (outlining the political, economic, military and 
cultural frictions between the United States and Europe); Joan Fitzpatrick, Speaking Law to 
Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 241, 244 (2003) (“For 
most of Europe, the counter-terrorism picture after September 11 differs not in kind but in de-
gree from that which prevailed before the attacks.”); Sabine von Schorlemer, Human Rights: 
Substantive and Institutional Implications of the War Against Terrorism, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 265, 
267-68 (2003) (explaining that the post-September 11 European reaction was characterized as a 
“civil” prevention strategy, while the United States response was described as a “military” re-
pression strategy). 
 16. See Anne Orford, The Gift of Formalism, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 179, 182-88 (2004) 
(reviewing THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY (Bruno Simma ed., 2d 
ed. 2002)).  “German speaking practitioners and academics” are seen as having a “fidelity to the 
text of the UN Charter as the constitution of a world community,” which is strikingly different 
from a number of prominent American international lawyers.  Id. at 179-80.  In addition, the 
largely European civil code-based legal system incorporates a different analytical approach than 
the common law-based approach that is predominant in North America.  See William Tetley, 
Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law vs Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified) (pt. 1) (Nov. 29, 
1999), at  http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/ review/articles/1999-3.htm (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2005) (“Firstly, common law statutes have to be read against a case law background, 
while civil law codes and statutes are the primary source of law. . . .  Secondly, civil law judges 
are influenced by Rousseau’s theory that the State is the source of all rights under the social 
contract, while English judges favour Hobbes’ theory that the individual agreed to forfeit to the 
State only certain rights.”). 
 17. The Canadian legal system has similarities to the American system in that it is pre-
dominantly common law-based; however, Canada retains a connection to the civil law legal sys-
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uniquely situated to bridge any gaps, both perceived and real, be-
tween European and North American approaches to humanitarian 
law.  However, confronting contemporary international humanitarian 
law issues can be as challenging for countries that have ratified Addi-
tional Protocol I, such as Canada, as they are for the United States. 
Unfortunately for all concerned, the more broadly accepted treaty 
law that binds nearly all nations and is widely recognized as reflecting 
customary international law, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions,18 
does not always provide clear or definitive answers to present-day 
operational challenges. 
Notwithstanding these challenges, the involvement of Canada’s 
military forces in operations with the United States has continued 
what has been a long-standing tradition of mutual defence co-
operation.19  The requirement for our two nations to work together 
militarily has been demonstrated repeatedly since the end of the Cold 
War.  This has included operations in Bosnia, the 1999 Kosovo bomb-
ing campaign, Haiti, Somalia, and Afghanistan; the 1991 Gulf Con-
flict; and a variety of maritime interdiction operations around the 
world.  While Canada was not a participant in the 2003 Iraq conflict, 
it has been a committed partner in the broader “campaign against ter-
rorism.” 
On October 24, 2001 Canada acted “in the exercise of the inher-
ent right of individual and collective self-defence in accordance with 
 
tem through Quebec’s mixed system, “derived partly from the civil law tradition and partly from 
the common law tradition.”  Tetley, supra note 17. 
 18. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions are: Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I-GC I]; Geneva Convention (II) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces 
at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.NT.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II-GC II]; 
Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III-GC III]; and Geneva Convention 
(IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 
75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV-GC IV]. 
 19. This was not always the case.  As late as the early 1930s Canadian defence planning 
reflected in Defence Scheme No. 1 viewed “the principal external threat to the security of Can-
ada lay in the possibility of armed invasion by forces of the United States.”  JAMES EAYRS, IN 
DEFENCE OF CANADA: FROM THE GREAT WAR TO THE GREAT DEPRESSION VOL. 1 71 (1964).  
Following increased defence cooperation during World War II bi-national planning became 
formalized with the creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence which held its first meet-
ing 7 to 8 November 1945.  This co-operative arrangement provided “in light of changed world 
conditions, a continuing basis for joint action of the military forces of Canada and the United 
States.”  JAMES EAYRS, IN DEFENCE OF CANADA: PEACEMAKING AND DETERRENCE VOL. 3 
336 (1972). 
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Article 51” in providing military forces in response to the armed at-
tacks on the United States. 20  That deployment involved infantry, 
Special Forces, naval and air force units deploying to the Gulf region 
to conduct operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.21  Further, 
Canada maintains significant participation in the International Secu-
rity Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.22  Also, the importance 
of defending North America is reflected in the mutual cooperation on 
national security.23  In military terms it is perhaps most tangibly dem-
onstrated in the NORAD agreement, which has provided for the 
aerospace defence of both countries since 1958.24 
The Canadian national security policy reflects the emphasis that 
is placed on a multilateral approach to international security.25  As is 
indicated in President Bush’s Halifax speech, the United States also 
 
 20. See Abbott, supra note 13, at 372 (quoting Letter to President of the UN Security 
Council from the Canadian Ambassador to the UN, October 24, 2001). 
 21. The Canadian Forces’ Contribution to the International Campaign Against Terrorism, 
CANADIAN NAT’L DEF. (Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/ 
view_news_e.asp?id=490 (last visited Feb. 28, 2005); see also Stephen Thorne, Canadian Special 
Forces Unit Cited for Heroism, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 8, 2004, at A15 (President Bush 
awarded Canadian elite units with the Presidential Unit Citation). 
 22. At the time of writing this article, that participation includes an armoured reconnais-
sance squadron, an engineering squadron, a training cadre to assist the Afghan National Army 
and an infantry company. Operation Athena: The Canadian Forces Participation in ISAF, 
CANADIAN NAT’L DEF. (Mar. 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/Athena/index_e.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
 23. PRIVY COUNCIL OFF. OF CANADA, SECURING AN OPEN SOCIETY: CANADA’S 
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 5 (Apr. 2004), available at http://www.pco-
bcp.gc.ca/docs/Publications/NatSecurnat/ natsecurnat_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) 
[hereinafter CANADA’S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY] (“The September 11 attacks 
demonstrated the profound effect an event in the United States could have on Canadians and 
the need to work together to address threats.  Canada is committed to strengthening North 
American security as an important means of enhancing Canadian security.”). 
 24. The development of joint air and radar defences in the immediate post World War II 
period to counter the Russian Cold War threat ultimately resulted in the creation of North 
American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) system in 1958.  See EAYRS, IN DEFENCE 
OF CANADA: PEACEMAKING AND DETERRENCE, supra note 20, at 319-72, for a discussion of bi-
national defence cooperation up to 1957.  For an outline of NORAD, see NAT’ COMM’N OF 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 16-17, 457 n. 
96 (July 21, 2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 
28, 2005) [hereinafter THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].  The NORAD agreement was most 
recently updated on August 5, 2004, with an agreement “that NORAD’s aerospace warning 
mission for North America also shall include aerospace warning, as defined in NORAD’s Terms 
of Reference, in support of the designated commands responsible for missile defence of North 
America.”  Exchange of Letters between the United States Secretary of State and Canadian 
Ambassador, Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.fac-aec.gc.ca/ department/note_0095-en.asp 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
 25. CANADA’S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, supra note 24, at 51-52. 
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places heavy reliance on multilateralism.26  This results in participa-
tion in coalition operations whether UN Security Council-sanctioned, 
in the exercise of self-defence, or otherwise (i.e. Kosovo).  As has 
been evidenced in ISAF, a large number of nations with differing le-
gal systems and varying interpretations of international law can oper-
ate in a complex security environment.27  During many multi-national 
operations national contingents operate pursuant to common Rules 
of Engagement (ROE).  When doing so there is room to accommo-
date unique national interpretations of the law.  The long United 
States and Canadian involvement in NATO itself reflects the ability 
of military forces to operate together while meeting their respective 
humanitarian law obligations.  If the application of humanitarian law 
in contemporary operations created substantive problems, it would 
not be possible to conduct operations on such a multilateral basis. 
Further, it must also be noted that the Canadian Forces placed 
considerable reliance on training offered by the United States mili-
tary before it developed its own comprehensive program in the 1980s.  
In that regard, the United States military has been a world leader in 
disseminating respect for humanitarian law in military forces 
throughout the world.  Consistent with both a shared common law 
background and considerable experience in operating with each 
other’s military forces, there is often a commonality in approach 
when dealing with practical operational law issues.  However, that is 
not to say there are not important differences in our respective na-
tional interpretations of international humanitarian law. 
The purpose of this commentary is to explore the respective 
United States and Canadian approaches in applying international 
humanitarian law in contemporary conflict in order to assess their po-
tential impact on cooperative military operations.  At the heart of this 
inquiry will be the goal of assessing the degree to which differences at 
the treaty or interpretive level translate into practical problems. 
These differences will be assessed in four areas. First, the issue of 
substantive differences in national legal obligations will be studied in 
the context of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
 
 26. See epigraph to this article, supra note 2. 
 27. As of April 27, 2004, ISAF consisted of 6,300 troops from 36 countries, including all 26 
NATO countries.  See Working to Bring Peace and Stability to Afghanistan, NORTH ATLANTIC 
TREATY ORG., May 2004 Briefing, at http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/afghanistan-e.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
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Their Destruction.28  The second potential difference will be exam-
ined in the context of “foundational” differences in defining terror-
ism.  The third and fourth areas involve targeting issues.  In the third 
area a subtle difference in the national definitions of “military objec-
tives” will be explored.  Finally, in the fourth area, an emerging area 
of controversy, the targeting of persons taking a direct part in hostili-
ties, will be assessed. 
II.  SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES IN LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 
It might be expected that the refusal of the United States to rat-
ify Additional Protocol I would be a particularly important area of 
inquiry concerning substantive differences in legal obligations agreed 
to by the two countries.  However, many conflicts in the post-Cold 
War period have been fought with a significant number of the partici-
pants not being Parties to Additional Protocol I.29  As has been noted, 
while the United States has not accepted a number of its provisions, 
such as the extension of combatant status to persons fighting for na-
tional liberation movements,30 portions of Additional Protocol I have 
been recognized as being reflective of customary international law.31 
A more dramatic example of the parting of the ways between 
Canada and the United States in terms of accepting substantively dif-
ferent legal obligations can be found in the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine 
Convention.  The championing by Canada of this important and 
groundbreaking international treaty created a scenario for potential 
operational challenges when serving in a coalition with the United 
States.  It is somewhat trite to state that Canada’s obligations under 
the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention place Canada’s armed forces in 
a position that is dramatically different than that of the United States.  
The United States has announced it will not become a party to the 
 
 28. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention]. 
 29. For example, notwithstanding the fact that Canada signed Additional Protocol I in De-
cember 1977 and ratified it on November 20, 1990, the Protocol did not apply to the 1991 Gulf 
War or to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan.  See Abbott, supra note 13, at 374 (“[T]here are 
no public statements by the Taliban (or Al-Qaeda) to accept or apply the GC or [Additional 
Protocol I].”). 
 30. See Letter of Transmittal, supra note 6 (Reagan administration’s criticisms of Addi-
tional Protocol I). 
 31. Christopher Greenwood, Customary Law Status of the 1977 Geneva Protocols, in 
HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT CHALLENGES AHEAD 93, 95 (Astrid J.M. Delis-
sen & Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991). 
WATKIN1.DOC 9/15/2005  10:11 AM 
2005] MILITARY INTEROPERABILITY AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 289 
Anti-Personnel Mines Convention and instead will rely on non-
persistent anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.32 
The Anti-Personnel Mines Convention clearly prohibits the use, 
development, production, stockpiling, retention or transfer of anti-
personnel mines, as well as assisting, encouraging or inducing such ac-
tivities.  As a result, Canadian Forces are giving specific directions 
setting out their international obligations when they operate along-
side forces of a nation which is not a party to the Convention.33  Such 
direction includes guidance on participation in combined operations, 
development and approval of rules of engagement, command and 
control, clearing of minefields and the occupation of previously mined 
terrain.34  For example, Canadian contingents may not use anti-
personnel mines and cannot request, even indirectly, the protection of 
those mines or encourage the use of such mines by others.  However, 
the use of command-detonated “claymore” type mines (i.e. triggered 
manually) is not prohibited. 35  The government direction includes in-
forming Canadian military personnel serving inside and outside the 
country with the Canadian Forces “or on international staffs, ex-
change postings or liaison postings”36 that they are subject to prosecu-
tion under military law for violations of the Anti-Personnel Mines 
Convention Implementation Act.37 
However, this does not mean that Canadian Forces personnel 
cannot participate in combined operations with states that are not 
bound by the Convention.  Canada deposited a Statement of Under-
standing which clearly indicates that the mere participation with non-
party states in operations, exercises or other military activity sanc-
tioned by the United Nations or otherwise conducted in accordance 
 
 32. New United States Policy on Landmines: Reducing Humanitarian Risk and Saving Lives 
of United States Soldiers, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Fact Sheet, at 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/30044.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).  Here, the United States 
has expressed a policy limiting anti-vehicle mines that appears more limiting than that required 
by international law.  The Anti-Personnel Mines Convention does not cover anti-vehicle mines 
which are “currently subject to modest restrictions.”  See Convention on Prohibitions or Restric-
tions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively 
Injurious or Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 I.L.M. 1523; 
David Kaye & Steven A. Solomon, The Second Review Conference on the 1980 Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons, 96 AM. J. INT’L. L. 922, 922-23 (2002) (noting that anti-vehicle 
mines are “entirely unregulated” by the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention). 
 33. OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVEL MANUAL , supra note 15, at 5A-1 to 5A-3. 
 34. Id., para. A002, 11., at 5A-2. 
 35. Id., para. A002, 9., 11a., at 5A-2. 
 36. Id., para. A002, 6., 11., at 5A-1, 5A-2. 
 37. Id., para. A002, 7., at 5A-2. 
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with international law would not in and of itself be considered assis-
tance, encouragement or inducement.38 
The Canadian Forces and those of other nations which are Par-
ties to the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention have continued to par-
ticipate in a wide variety of operations with the United States, includ-
ing operating in U.S.-led coalitions.39  In respect of Canadian military 
operations, the absence of practical problems appears to be for three-
fold: first, the lack of use of such mines in the conduct of contempo-
rary coalition operations; second, Canada is not the only coalition 
partner with whom the United States has to deal with that has these 
legal obligations; and finally, as has been noted, Canadian Forces 
commanders and other personnel are made aware of their legal obli-
gations.  Therefore, if the issue of the employment of anti-personnel 
land mines did arise the Canadian Forces member would be required 
to take steps to ensure neither national nor individual involvement. 
In respect of contemporary operations, the “leveling” effect of 
multilateral operations cannot be overstated.  The decision to coop-
erate in military coalitions such as NATO has long required partici-
pating states, including both Canada and the U.S., to adopt doctrine 
 
 38. The Statement of Understanding reads: 
It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that, in the context of operations, 
exercises or other military activity sanctioned by the United Nations or otherwise con-
ducted in accordance with international law, the mere participation by the Canadian 
Forces, or individual Canadians, in operations, exercises or other military activity con-
ducted in combination with the armed forces of States not a party to the Convention 
which engage in activity prohibited under the Convention would not, by itself, be con-
sidered to be assistance, encouragement or inducement in accordance with the mean-
ing of those terms in article 1, paragraph 1 (c). 
Id., para. A001, at 5A-1.  Canada is not unique in this regard; both the Australian Declaration, 
Mar. 12, 1997, and the United Kingdom Declaration, Mar. 12 1997, stated that exercises with the 
armed forces of other States would not, by themselves, be considered violations of the Conven-
tion.  The texts of both Declarations are available at INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Treaty 
Database, at http://www.icrc.org/ihl (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
 39. For example, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand and a number of other countries are Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mines 
Convention, but continue to operate in coalition forces with the United States either as part of 
NATO, or as part of a broader campaign against terrorism.  For a list of the State Parties to the 
Anti-personnel Mines Convention see State Parties and Signatories, available at INT’L COMM. 
OF THE RED CROSS, Treaty Database, http://www.icrc.org/ihl (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).  
Canadian Forces personnel and units do often serve in formations commanded by other 
coalition partners.  While doing so Canadian personnel are required to obey lawful commands 
of coalition superiors.  However, full command is retained with the Canadian Chief of Defence 
staff.  Further, Canadian Forces personnel are required to apply Canadian law and 
interpretations of international law in the conduct of all operations.  CANADIAN NAT’L DEF., 
USE OF FORCE IN CF OPERATIONS, at 2-1 – 2-5 (Nov. 5, 2004), available at 
http://www.dcds.forces.gc.ca/jointDoc/docs/B-GJ-005-300_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2005). 
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and make operational decisions that account for the legal, political 
and operational obligations of coalition partners. 
III.  DEFINING TERRORISM 
A second area where differences in United States and Canadian 
approaches to humanitarian law might impact on bi-national or coali-
tion operations is in respect of “terrorism.”  This analysis will first 
look at issues surrounding the joint participation of the two nations in 
the “War on Terror” and then explore what appears to be a funda-
mental difference in national interpretations of what constitutes “ter-
rorism” under humanitarian law. 
A. The War on Terror 
The post 9/11 conflict has been wrought by controversy because 
of its linkage to “terrorism.”  The use of the phrase “War on Terror” 
has been particularly contentious.  In part, this has occurred because, 
regardless of whether the reference to “war” is made rhetorically or 
otherwise, the term implies a reliance on military forces governed by 
international humanitarian law in respect of activity that has often 
been viewed as being amenable to law enforcement response gov-
erned by a human rights paradigm.40 
Further, the terms “terror” or “terrorism” are sometimes criti-
cized for their lack of precision.41  For example, criticism has been 
made that a state cannot become involved in an armed conflict with-
out an “identifiable party.”42  In this regard, “terror” has a dictionary 
definition of “extreme fear or dread”43 while “terrorism” is “the sys-
tematic employment of violence and intimidation to coerce a gov-
 
 40. Expressions of preference for a human rights-based solution to trans-national terrorism 
can be found in von Schorlemer, supra note 16, at 270-71, Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorism and the 
Rule of Law, 3 WASH U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 135, 136 (2004) and Anthony Dworkin, 
Revising the Law of War to Account for Terrorism, Findlaw’s Writ Legal Commentary (Feb. 4, 
2003), at http://writ.news.find law.com/commentary/20030204_dworkin.html (last visited Feb. 28, 
2005). 
 41. See Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges 
from the “War on Terror,” 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 60-61 (2003) (“Terrorism is not a 
legal notion.  This very fact indicates the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of determining how 
terrorism and responses to it may be identified historically or defined within a legal regime.”). 
 42. Id. at 60. 
 43. THE CANADIAN OXFORD DICTIONARY 1607 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter THE 
CANADIAN OXFORD DICTIONARY).  See also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 1217 (10th ed. 1996) [hereinafter MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY] (“a state 
of intense fear”). 
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ernment or community. . . .”44  However, it appears that the real crux 
of the definitional problem is not that it is misunderstood.  Terrorism 
is carried out by groups, which may not be “states” or may be crimi-
nal in nature.  While it is not a universally held view, there has been 
considerable reluctance to acknowledge that armed conflict can occur 
between anything other than two states or groups having state-like at-
tributes (i.e. controlling territory).45  Whatever the controversy, the 
link between Al Qaeda and the Taliban as the de facto rulers of Af-
ghanistan appears to have muted discussion somewhat about whether 
military operations by a state against a non-state actor can be consid-
ered an international armed conflict.46 
The indication in 2001 that the network of terrorist groups linked 
to Al Qaeda extended to 60 countries and statements that the war on 
terror “will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has 
been found, stopped and defeated”47 precipitated questions regarding 
the scope of state action.  Concerns have been expressed that such an 
 
 44. THE CANADIAN OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at 1607; see also MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at 1217 (“the systematic use of terror esp. as a means 
of coercion. . .”). 
 45. See Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of 
International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 993 (2001) (“It is obvious in this case ‘war’ is a mis-
nomer.  War is an armed conflict between two or more states.”); Joan Fitzpatrick, Agora: Mili-
tary Commissions, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 
96 AM. J. INT’L L. 345, 348 (2002) (noting that the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 
I “make no provision for an international armed conflict between a state and a transnational 
criminal network with control over no territory. . .”); but see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control 
of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 83, 99 (2002) 
(“. . .only states can be at war.  Clearly, however, a state can be engaged in an armed conflict 
with an insurgent or revolutionary group, irrespective of that group’s legitimacy, and vice 
versa.”); Rona, supra note 42, at 60, 61 (“A terrorist group can conceivably be a party to an 
armed conflict and a subject of humanitarian law, but the lack of commonly accepted definitions 
is a hurdle.”). 
 46. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 46, at 349 (“The attacks of September 11, if attributable to a 
foreign state linked to Al Qaeda, clearly could give rise to an international armed conflict be-
tween the United States and the sponsor state.”); see also RICHARD FALK, THE GREAT 
TERROR WAR 101 (2003) (discussing the “American recourse to self-defence and related  deci-
sion to wage war against Afghanistan,” and that it was reasonable to regard the Taliban as “in-
directly responsible for the attacks, and therefore subject to accountability in the furtherance of 
defensive claims.”); Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the ‘War Against Terror-
ism,’ 78 INT’L AFF. 301, 314 (2002) (After indicating that the fighting between the United States 
and Al Qaeda does not meet the “moulds” of a conflict between states or within a state, the au-
thor notes, “there was an armed conflict between Afghanistan and the United States (and its 
allies).”). 
 47. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American 
People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html (last visited Feb. 28, 
2005) [hereinafter Address to Congress]. 
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approach “may lead to a third world war.”48  States have been accused 
of panicked reactions with “a rush to jettison familiar legal frame-
works.”49  Further, it has been noted that a war on terror might be 
“used as a pretext for political campaigns by some governments” and 
as a basis for legitimizing human rights violations.50  It also cannot be 
discounted that some of the criticism of the “war” on terror originates 
with a pacifist element that has long been associated with the human 
rights movement.51  As can be expected in well established democra-
cies, such as the United States and Canada, there has also been de-
bate regarding the domestic legislative action taken to deal with the 
terrorist threat.52 
Notwithstanding the concerns expressed about the present con-
flict, the United States’ “War on Terror,” and what is often termed in 
Canada as a “campaign against terrorism,”53 has included military par-
ticipation in an armed conflict of international proportions.54  In this 
regard the broad, coalition of states who have acted in self-defence to 
take the conflict to the Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan 
 
 48. Cassese, supra note 46, at 997.  See also Fitzpatrick, supra note 46, at 347 (“If the war 
on terrorism is now to be conceived of as an international armed conflict, it is one of startling 
breadth, innumerable ‘combatants,’ and indefinite duration.”). 
 49. Fitzpatrick, supra note 16, at 244-45. 
 50. Von Schorlemer, supra note 16, at 275-76. 
 51. See Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights, the Laws of War and Terrorism, 69 SOC. RES. 
1137, 1144 (2002) (discussion of the connection between human rights and pacifism); Nicholas 
Rengger, On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century, 78 INT’L AFF. 353, 354 (2002) 
(“[P]acifism, was virtually unheard-of prior to the coming of Chrisitanity but has been a persis-
tent, if minority, position ever since. . . .”); see also MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 
13 (2004) (“[A]ll killing of civilians is (something close to) murder . . . therefore every war is 
unjust.  So pacifism reemerges from the very heart of the theory that was originally meant to 
replace it.  This is the strategy adopted . . . by many opponents of the Afghanistan war.”). 
 52. See, e.g., Ian Macleod, Did the Government Go too Far?, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 11, 
2004, at B1; Jennifer Barrett, Promoting the Patriot Act, MSNBC.com (Apr. 26, 2004), at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4839040/site/newsweek/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
 53. The Canadian use of the word “campaign” can be interpreted to include a broader par-
ticipation of security personnel than military forces.  In addition to being a series of military op-
erations, it is also defined as “an organized course of action for a particular purpose. . . .” THE 
CANADIAN OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at 219.  However, the American vision of the 
war on terror also envisages a broader campaign, using resources other than military force.  As 
President Bush stated on September 20, 2001: “Americans should not expect one battle, but a 
lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen,” including the involvement of police and 
intelligence agencies.  Address to Congress, supra note 48. 
 54. While not without some controversy, there has been acceptance from the world com-
munity of acting in self-defence to the incidents of 9/11 in the form of a U.S.-led coalition 
against Al Qaeda terrorists and the Taliban in Afghanistan involved participation in an interna-
tional armed conflict.  See generally Watkin, supra note 4, at 2-6; FALK, supra note 47; Fitz-
patrick, supra note 46; Greenwood, supra note 47. 
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represents a remarkable collective response to a new 21st century 
threat. 
The reaction of both the United States and Canada to trans-
national terrorism has decidedly not been limited to military opera-
tions.  It has also included intelligence gathering, law enforcement, 
enhanced border security and measures to limit terrorist funding.  
Considerable emphasis has been placed on domestic security operat-
ing in the context of law enforcement.  Indeed, one challenge pre-
sented to both countries has been the development of national secu-
rity strategies that include both military and law enforcement 
responses to the same threat of trans-national terrorism.55 
Like the United States, Canada has been confronted with the re-
ality that geography alone does not provide sufficient security against 
international terrorists.  The fact that both countries are such close 
neighbours and share a long militarily undefended border creates ad-
ditional reasons to work together for mutual security.  Included in this 
effort is the prospect of using military airpower to shoot down hi-
jacked civilian airplanes pursuant to a NORAD defence agreement 
originally premised on a Russian nuclear threat.  As nation states and 
close neighbours, both countries are committed to confronting the 
contemporary terrorist threat together.  However, the question re-
mains as to whether “terrorism” as a concept is understood in the 
same way in both countries. 
B. Terrorism and Humanitarian Law 
What then are the Canadian and American interpretations of 
“terrorism,” and in what way does their application differ in terms of 
international humanitarian law?  To the extent the national defini-
tional approaches are different, will this in turn impact on the scope 
of operations that fall under the rubric of “terrorism?”  While terror-
ism has been studied intensively for at least the past quarter century, 
there still is no common internationally recognized definition.  “Ter-
rorism” is an emotive term that is often used in a pejorative way to 
demonize opponents.  As the acts that constitute terrorism are usually 
 
 55. See WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY viii (2002), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf  (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (six 
critical mission areas are identified as: intelligence and warning, border and transportation secu-
rity, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic 
terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response); CANADA’S NATIONAL SECURITY 
POLICY, supra note 24, at vii-xi (the key measures are intelligence, emergency planning and 
management, public health, transport security, border security and international security). 
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separate crimes in their own right, the analysis often becomes one of 
considering the moral nature of the activity.56  However, most defini-
tions of terrorism do share a common factor: politically motivated 
behaviour.57  This is likely because “all would agree that political vio-
lence is different from ordinary crime, in that it is planned to force 
changes in government actions, people, structures, or even ideol-
ogy. . . .”58 
Terror can be used by a diverse set of actors ranging from indi-
vidual criminals to states.  As has been noted, it is this long associa-
tion of terrorism with criminal activity that has clouded many assess-
ments of the contemporary conflict with trans-national terrorists.  
However, the use of terror has been and remains a part of warfare.  A 
goal of many military operations is to instill fear or dread in an oppo-
nent.  It remains an integral part of warfare to attempt to terrify your 
military opponent, although the means of doing that are not unlim-
ited.59  What ultimately is prohibited is the targeting of civilian popu-
lations.60 
A potential point of departure in the respective national ap-
proaches appears to arise over whether the “terrorism” label should 
be applied exclusively to the acts of group members or whether the 
status of a group as a non-state actor is itself a relevant factor.  In 
other words the issue becomes one of group “legitimacy.”  In this re-
gard, some approaches to defining terrorism appear to have a bias in 
favour of state activity such that terrorism is often associated with 
revolutionary movements or other non-state actors.61 
 
 56. See GRANT WARDLAW, POLITICAL TERRORISM 4-5 (1982) (considering terrorism as a 
moral problem).  Attempts have been made to define terrorism by the types of offences which 
are repeatedly used by terrorist groups such as assassination, kidnapping and hijacking.  How-
ever, it is concluded that “too many terrorist actions duplicate either military or criminal acts,” 
and that what is characteristic of terrorism is not the acts, but rather the “intended political 
function.” CHARLES TOWNSHEND, TERRORISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 5 (2002). 
 57. Jan Klabbers, Rebel With a Cause? Terrorists and Humanitarian Law, 14 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 299, 307 (2003). 
 58. PHILLIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA 7 (1998). 
 59. Additional Protocol I, supra note 5, at art. 35(1), states that “[i]n any armed conflict, 
the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.” 
 60. Id. at art. 51(2) (“Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread 
terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”). See also Protocol Additional to the Ge-
neva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 13(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442 [here-
inafter Additional Protocol II] (using the same language). 
 61. See GRANT WARDLAW, supra note 57, at 5-8 (governments with their substantial re-
sources; well-recognized claims to legitimacy; and the identification of the population with the 
larger bureaucracy of government often successfully condemn individual terrorism as morally 
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The United States Department of State defines terrorism as 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, 
usually intended to influence an audience.” 62  This reference to “sub-
national” groups appears to highlight non-state status.  Similarly, the 
definition of terrorism found in the Crimes and Elements for Trials by 
Military Commissions provides an exception where the conduct does 
not “constitute an attack against a lawful military objective under-
taken by military forces of a State in the exercise of their official du-
ties.”63  The effect of the reference to “military forces of a State” may 
be that an otherwise lawful attack under humanitarian law would be 
considered terrorism if it were carried out by armed forces that did 
not belong to a State.  In both cases, “terrorism” appears focused on 
the non-state status of the group involved. 
The “legitimacy” issue arises most obviously in respect of the 
unwillingness of the United States to ratify Additional Protocol I.  It 
is difficult to obtain a comprehensive contemporary analysis of the 
reasons for the continuing reluctance to ratify Additional Protocol I.  
However, it is clear that in 1987 there were two areas of particular 
concern.  The objections to Additional Protocol I rested in part on 
the legitimization of “wars of national liberation,” which was viewed 
as a politicization of humanitarian law, and the granting of combatant 
status to irregular forces which do not satisfy the traditional criteria 
for combatancy.64  In the words of President Reagan, “[t]his would 
endanger civilians among whom terrorists and other irregulars at-
tempt to conceal themselves.”65  As a result, the United States “must 
not, and need not, give recognition and protection to terrorist groups 
as a price for progress in humanitarian law.”66  In this regard, the is-
sues of “wars of national liberation” and combatant status are linked, 
 
repugnant while official terrorism either is not recognised at all or is accepted as severe, but 
necessary). 
 62. Patterns of Global Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Off. of the Coordinator for Terror-
ism (Apr. 2004), at xii, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31932.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Patterns of Global Terrorism].  This definition of terrorism is 
taken from Title 22 of the United States Code.  See 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (2004). 
 63. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION NO. 2, at 13 
(Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.dod.gov/news/May2003/d20030430milcominstno2.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION NO. 2]. 
 64. Letter of Transmittal, supra note 6, at 911.  See also Feith, supra note 6, at 531-32 (re-
viewing the adoption of the “national liberation” language in Additional Protocol I). 
 65. Letter of Transmittal, supra note 6, at 911. 
 66. Id. at 911. 
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as article 44(3) of the Protocol was specifically designed to address ir-
regular forces in such conflicts and during periods of occupation.67 
In another analysis, Abraham Sofaer, the legal advisor to the 
Department of State, noted, “with a group like the PLO, elements of 
which often use terrorist tactics, this distinction becomes very impor-
tant.  Treating these terrorists as soldiers also enhances their stature, 
to the detriment of the civilized community.”68  This last comment 
raises the issue of the degree to which the terrorist acts of some mem-
bers brand the entire group to which they belong.69  It has been noted 
that in uprisings fought during the decolonization period of 1960s and 
1970s, “insurgents and revolutionary groups resorted to acts of terror-
violence. . .which led to their being referred to as terrorists.”70  Fur-
ther, “[f]ew organizations exist solely for the purpose of engaging in 
terrorist activity.”71  While “terrorism” clashes with legitimacy, “it 
properly describe[s] the means employed to those ends.  This legiti-
macy-versus-means issue is still with us today.”72 
It is clear that Canada and the eighty-four percent of the world’s 
nation-states73 who have ratified Additional Protocol I do not share 
 
 67. See Christopher Greenwood, Terrorism and Humanitarian Law—The Debate over Ad-
ditional Protocol I, 19 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 187, 203 (1989), where the author notes that Addi-
tional Protocol I, art. 44(3), was intended to apply in wars of national liberation and during oc-
cupation.  Canada entered a reservation at the time of ratifying the Additional Protocol that 
“the situation described in the second sentence of paragraph 3 of Article 44 can exist only in 
occupied territory or in armed conflicts covered by paragraph 4 of Article 1. . . .”  The text of 
the Canadian Declaration is available at INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 40. 
 68. Sofaer, supra note 6, at 786; see also Feith, supra note 6, at 532-33 (Western countries 
argued that Article 2(4) would “license foreign meddling in internal conflicts and politicize hu-
manitarian law.”).  For a recent criticism of the United State’s position, see Hans-Peter Gasser, 
Acts of Terror,”Terrorism” and International Humanitarian Law, 84 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 547, 
562-64 (2002). 
 69. See Gerald L. Neuman, Humanitarian Law and Counterterrorist Force, 14 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 283, 294-95 (2003) for a discussion of the challenges of categorizing groups where only a por-
tion of a “private militia” might be considered to engage in terrorist acts.  As the author notes, it 
is “[m]ore likely, a group that engages in terrorism would not bifurcate itself and isolate its ter-
rorist component from a conventional armed force.  It . . . would predispose and train them to 
attack civilians.  The entire group would then be properly denied combatant status.”  Id.; see 
also Patterns of Global Terrorism, supra note 63, at xii (“The term terrorist group means any 
group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.”). 
 70. Bassiouni, supra note 46, at 97. 
 71. Neuman, supra note 70, at 289.  Gerald Neuman adopts the approach that a ‘terrorist 
organization” is “any non-state organization that has committed terrorist acts. . .in the past, and 
that has a policy of committing terrorist acts such that further terrorist acts can be expected in 
the future.”  Id. 
 72. Bassiouni, supra note 46, at 97. 
 73. As of February 28, 2005, there are 162 states parties to the Additional Protocol and 192 
states parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra 
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the concerns expressed by the United States, at least not to the extent 
that they posed an impediment to ratification.  An alternate approach 
is not to consider the “legitimacy” of the group by virtue of its non-
state status, but rather to concentrate on the actions of the members.74  
Specific reference to an “act” is found in the definition of terrorism in 
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism.75  That definition was accepted by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Suresh v. Canada Minister of Citizenship and Immigration76 
as reflecting the essence of what the world understands by terrorism. 
The question remains whether different national approaches to 
defining terrorism impact on the ability of Canada and the United 
States to operate together militarily.  In reality the potential for any 
problems is quite limited.  First, the likelihood of an insurgent group 
meeting the requirements of Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I is 
considered by many scholars to be remote.77  As a result the legiti-
macy of a national liberation movement will not likely have to be ad-
dressed.   
Secondly, in situations of occupation, the other circumstance 
where the relaxed criteria for combatancy of Additional Protocol I is 
most likely to apply, nation-states may be compelled to consider their 
own history.  Such reflection may restrain a rush to judgment that 
members of organized resistance movements or other unprivileged 
 
note 40, available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/party_gc (last visited Feb. 
28, 2005). 
 74. Klabbers, supra note 58, at 311 (“Hence, one should not go around mistreating people 
for the sole reason that they fight under the banner of an entity of a different form than the 
dominant one of the state, all other things remaining equal.”). 
 75. GA Res. 54/109, GAOR 6th Comm., 54th Sess., Annex. Art. 2(1) (Dec. 9, 1999), states: 
 Any. . .act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other 
person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when 
the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or 
compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing 
any act. 
 76. [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3.  Although the Supreme Court of Canada rejects a “functional” test 
(e.g., one based on specific acts of violence such as hijacking, hostage taking, etc.), the “stipula-
tive” test the court does accept is still one based on acts and not status.  Similarly, under Cana-
dian criminal law, terrorism definitions are focused on “activities,” “acts” or “omissions.”  See 
the definitions of “terrorist activities” and “terrorist groups” in the Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 
46, § 83.01 (1985) (Can.). 
 77. See Aldrich, supra note 6, at 7 (arguing that Article 1(4) “poses no threat to the United 
States or its NATO allies and needs no reservation”); cf. Letter of Transmittal, supra note 6, at 
910-12 (rejecting Protocol I’s treatment of wars of “national liberation” as undermining humani-
tarian law and endangering civilians).  See also Meron, supra note 6, at 683 (“[I]n view of [Arti-
cle 1(4)’s] limited scope, the changed circumstances and the improbability of its ever being given 
effect, could not U.S. concerns be remedied by appropriate interpretations or reservations?”). 
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belligerents are automatically “terrorists.”  In this regard the exten-
sive support for, and use of, resistance movements during World War 
II cannot be forgotten.78  Further, the use of military and paramilitary 
forces to support intelligence agencies throughout the past fifty years 
should have a limiting effect on any interpretation that the status of 
the group, rather than acts of individual members, should be used to 
justify a “terrorist” label.79 
Further, the requirement to consider “legitimacy” simply should 
not arise for many types of conflicts.80  For example, in respect of non-
international armed conflicts, there is a clear understanding that 
members of insurgent forces are not entitled to combatant status, 
notwithstanding the provisions of Additional Protocol II encouraging 
the granting of amnesty to persons who have participated in the con-
flict.81  Captured personnel may be treated as criminals, although this 
does not necessarily mean they are “terrorists.”  In addition, there 
will be some groups for whom there is little doubt that they should be 
termed “terrorists.”  For example, there is a clear consensus that Al 
Qaeda is a terrorist group committed by both word and deed to at-
tack innocent civilians82 and commit acts that reach the level of crimes 
against humanity.83 
It is also open to conclude that in cases where a state harbours 
terrorists, the state’s armed forces would not necessarily be identified 
as “terrorists.”  In any resulting international armed conflict, captured 
members of those armed forces would ordinarily qualify for lawful 
 
 78. See ROBERT B. ASPREY, WAR IN THE SHADOWS VOL. I (1975). Chapters 31 to 51 pro-
vide a detailed outline of the Allied involvement in supporting organized resistance movements, 
including the operations of the Special Operations Executive-SOE, the Office of Strategic Ser-
vices-OSS and the Russian Central Staff of the Partisan Movement.  See generally Henri Mey-
rowitz, Les Operations de Commando et le Droit de la Guerre, 18 THE MIL. L. AND L. OF WAR 
REV. 74 (1979). 
 79. See generally STEPHEN DORRIL, MI6: INSIDE THE COVERT WORLD OF HER 
MAJESTY’S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 729 (2002); MICHAEL E. HAAS, IN THE DEVIL’S 
SHADOW: U.N. SPECIAL OPERATIONS DURING THE KOREAN WAR (2000); Bob Woodward, 
Secret CIA Units Playing a Central Combat Role, WASH POST, Nov. 18, 2001, at A1. 
 80. See Waldemar A. Solf, A Response to Douglas J. Feith’s Law in the Service of Terror—
The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol, 20 AKRON L. REV. 261, 266 (1986) (stating that 
Additional Protocol I “does not apply to internal rebellions and insurgencies, and it certainly 
does not apply to situations of internal tensions and disorders”). 
 81. Additional Protocol II, supra note 61, at art. 6(5). 
 82. A 1998 Fatwa issued by Osama Bin Laden indicated there was a duty to kill Athe 
Americans and their Allies, civilians and military.  ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA 
45-46 (2002). 
 83. Bassiouni, supra note 46, at 101; Cassese, supra note 46, at 994-95; von Schorlemer, su-
pra note 16, at 272-74. 
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combatant, and therefore prisoner of war, status, in most instances.  
However, attaining combatant/prisoner of war status is not automatic 
and, while not without controversy, it is possible for group exclusion 
on the basis of a failure to comply with international humanitarian 
law.84  Further, even if such group exclusion were to occur, that does 
not mean the reasons for the exclusion would raise issues of terrorist 
activity. 
The question remains whether different national approaches to 
defining “terrorism” will have a negative impact on Canadian and 
United States participation in joint operations.  Notwithstanding is-
sues like the scope of a war on terror, the decision to use military 
forces would obviously rest on factors such as the nature of the threat 
and the requirement to act in self-defence.  Ironically, the United 
States and Canada share a unique history.  The international law 
standard-setting Caroline case involved the exercise of a right to self-
defence against non-state actors operating across the international 
border between the two countries.85 
Ultimately the response of each nation would have to be assessed 
according to their respective interpretations of international law and 
application of national policy.  The decision to use military forces 
would not be based simply on the use of the label “terrorism.”  Once 
the decision is made to embark on operations, there should be limited 
impact on the ability of the two nations to operate against non-state 
actors who are involved in terrorism.  Further, in the context of the 
campaign against terrorism there is also a myriad of other options for 
state action (i.e. law enforcement, intelligence gathering) that can be 
conducted either bi-nationally or multilaterally.  Those actions can be 
 
 84. See Gasser, supra note 6, at 919 (Armed forces, under Additional Protocol I, “have to 
be under the control of [a party to an international armed conflict]. Groups that do not meet 
that requirement may not claim a privileged position under international law.”); Greenwood, 
supra note 68, at 206 (noting that a “group that systematically practices terrorist acts” risks los-
ing combatant/prisoner of war status); Kenneth Watkin, Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents 
and Conflict in the 21st Century, 1 ISR. DEF. FORCES L. REV. 69, 81-84 (2003) (arguing that group 
exclusion may occur in respect of “terrorists organizations that by definition do not respect the 
fundamental distinction between combatants and civilians in their actions and sometimes 
overtly reject any requirement to do so”).  This latter article was first produced as a policy brief 
for the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, available at 
http://www.ihlresearch.org/ihl/pdfs/Session2.pdf (last visited on Feb. 28, 2005). 
 85. See Greenwood, supra note 47, at 308 (noting that the Caroline case “is still regarded as 
the classical definition of the right of self-defence in international law”); Michael Hoffman, 
Quelling Unlawful Belligerency: The Juridical Status and Treatment of Terrorists Under the Laws 
of War, 31 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 161, 171-72 (2001) (conducting a review of the Caroline case). 
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taken concurrently with military action or separately where the use of 
military force is not feasible or supported at law. 
IV.  SUBTLE DIFFERENCES:  
THE DEFINITION OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES 
An area where there is a more subtle difference in national ap-
proaches to humanitarian law is in the definition of “military objec-
tive.”  In this article “objective” is discussed in the context of “ob-
jects” rather than persons.86  Defining “objects” as military objectives 
is an essential part of complying with the principle of distinction.  
Combined with the proportionality principle, directing an attack at 
the proper objective is a key aspect of lawful targeting.  Unfortu-
nately, “[t]here has been relatively little discussion in the relevant lit-
erature of what constitutes a military objective and why, since the 
adoption of Protocol I in 1977.”87 
A. National Approaches 
Having ratified Additional Protocol I, Canada relies on the defi-
nition found in Article 52(2), which reads in part: 
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to 
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make 
an effective contribution to military action and whose total or par-
tial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances rul-
ing at the time, offers a definite military advantage.88 
Since most of the world’s nation-states have also ratified Additional 
Protocol I it would appear that this wording reflects the broad inter-
national consensus of the definition of “military objective.” 
 
 86. Additional Protocol I, supra note 5, at art. 52(2), specifically limits its definition to “ob-
jects.”  Art. 57(2) refers separately to people and objects in terms of the precautions an attacker 
must take.  For example, in art. 57(2)(a)(i), persons who plan or decide upon an attack must do 
everything feasible to verify that “objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian ob-
jects. . . .”  The test for targeting civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, in art. 51(3), is differ-
ent than for objects, in art. 52(2). 
 87. W.J. Fenrick, Targeting and Proportionality during the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 489, 495 (2001).  However, for a discussion of targeting 
in the 1991 Gulf Conflict, see Micheal Lewis, The Law of Aerial Bombardment in the 1991 Gulf 
War, 97 AM. J. INT’L. L. 481 (2003). 
 88. Additional Protocol I, supra note 5, at art. 52(2); see also OPERATIONAL AND 
TACTICAL LEVEL MANUAL, para. 406.2, at 4-1-4-2: 
“Military objectives” are objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make 
an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, cap-
ture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military 
advantage. A specific area of land may constitute a military objective. 
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The position adopted by the United States on the definition of 
“military objective” is less clear and to a certain extent broader than 
the Additional Protocol wording.  The lack of clarity arises from the 
different definitions used by the different United States military ser-
vices.  The Air Force and the Army have adopted definitions of “mili-
tary objective” based on the Additional Protocol wording,89 while the 
United States Navy substitutes the phrase “enemy’s war-fighting or 
war-sustaining capability” for “military action.”90  The issue of which 
definition is a definitive one is interesting, since it is aerial targeting 
(primarily air force, but also having naval and army aspects) which 
has historically attracted the most scrutiny.  However, there is an in-
dication of a broader acceptance of the naval version since the Mili-
tary Commission Instruction No. 2 definition uses the “war-fighting or 
war-sustaining” wording.91 
It has been noted that an inference to be drawn from the decision 
to use alternate wording is that the United States has rejected the 
“presumptively narrower definition contained in. . . .Additional Pro-
 
 89. For the Air Force definition, see THE MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW 550 (7th 
ed. 2004) available at http://milcom.jag.af.mil/milcom2004-complete.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 
2005), which states: 
Attacks must be limited to military objectives, i.e., any objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose 
total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at 
the time, offers a definite military advantage. Examples include troops, bases, supplies, 
lines of communications, and headquarters. 
The Army definition, found in U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF 
LAND WARFARE, Chap. 2, para. 40(c) (1976), available at 
http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/ view/public/296783-1/fm/27-10/Ch2.htm#s4 (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2005), states: 
Military objectives—i.e., combatants, and those objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or 
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage—are permissible objects of attack (including bom-
bardment).  Military objectives include, for example, factories producing munitions 
and military supplies, military camps, warehouses storing munitions and military sup-
plies, ports and railroads being used for the transportation of military supplies, and 
other places that are for the accommodation of troops or the support of military opera-
tions. 
 90. See Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The Principle of the Military Objective in the Law of 
Armed Conflict, 8 A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 45-46 (1997-1998) (discussing the debate sur-
rounding the adoption of the “war-fighting or war-sustaining capability” variation). 
 91. MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION NO. 2, supra note 64, at 3. Military objective is 
defined as: 
“Military objectives” are those potential targets during an armed conflict which, by 
their nature, location, purpose, or use, effectively contribute to the opposing force’s 
war-fighting or war-sustaining capability and whose total or partial destruction, cap-
ture, or neutralization would constitute a military advantage to the attacker under the 
circumstances at the time of the attack. 
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tocol I in favor of one that, at least arguably, encompasses a broader 
range of objects and products.”92  One group of experts who worked 
on the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed 
Conflicts at Sea93 was of the view the broader definition “could too 
easily be interpreted to justify unleashing . . . the type of indiscrimi-
nate attacks that annihilated entire cities during that war . . . and at-
tacks on civilians. . .because of the general economic support they 
gave to the enemy.”94  However, that assessment has been criticized as 
an “exaggerated claim.”95  It also appears to be at odds with the tar-
geting doctrine and the practice of the United States military during 
the past decade.  While human rights groups have criticized aspects of 
United States and Coalition targeting decisions,96 including the use of 
cluster munitions near populated areas, it is clear the United States 
leads the world in the development and application of precision tar-
geting.97 
 
 92. Robertson, supra note 91, at 46. 
 93. INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald-Beck ed. 1995) [hereinafter THE 
SAN REMO MANUAL]. 
 94. Louise Doswald-Beck, The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to 
Armed Conflicts at Sea, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 192, 199 (1995); see also Marco Sassoli, Targeting: The 
Scope and Utility of the Concept of “Military Objectives” for the Protection of Civilians in Con-
temporary Armed Conflicts, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS?: APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST 
CENTURY CONFLICTS 181, 196 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005). 
 95. Robertson, supra note 91, at 50.  It has been noted that the Additional Protocol I, art. 
52(2), definition was “presumably, intended to, at a minimum, shift targeting decision-makers 
away from a list-oriented approach to military objectives and towards a situation-dependent, 
criterion-oriented approach.”  Fenrick, supra note 88, at 495.  However, art. 52(2) has been 
criticized because it is too “abstract and generic,” as it does not provide a list of specific military 
objectives “if only on a illustrative, non-exhaustive, basis.”  DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 83.  Pro-
fessor Dinstein’s observation is compelling since any attempt to put general targeting norms 
into effect leads to discussions of specific types and categories of objectives (i.e., electrical gen-
erating stations, rail yards). 
 96. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF TARGET: THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND 
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN IRAQ 6 (Dec. 2003), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203/usa1203.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (stating that 
the U.S. “used an unsound targeting methodology” that was “compounded by a lack of effective 
assessment both prior to the attacks of the potential risks to civilians and after the attacks of 
their success and utility”); see generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,  Civilian Deaths in the NATO 
Air Campaign, Vol. 12, No. 1 (D) (Feb. 2000) available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/ 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2005); AMNESTY INT’L, NATO/FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 
“COLLATERAL DAMAGE” OR UNLAWFUL KILLINGS? (June 2000), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/kosovo/docs/nato_all.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
 97. See Michael N. Schmitt, The Impact of High and Low-Tech Warfare on the Principle of 
Distinction, Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Working Paper 
(Nov. 2003), available at http://www.michaelschmitt.org/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) for an as-
sessment of the significant challenges facing technologically advanced countries like the United 
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B. Analysis of the Additional Protocol I Standard and Canada’s Po-
sition 
In assessing the respective national approaches to defining a 
“military objective” it must be noted there is no consensus on the 
scope of the Additional Protocol I provision.  The attacks on “dual-
use” targets such as bridges, government ministries, refineries and 
media outlets during the 1999 Kosovo campaign have attracted par-
ticular controversy.  Part of that controversy has centred on the pur-
pose of the attacks and whether they were intended to attack the will 
of the people.98  Of course, neither the civilian population nor indi-
vidual civilians can lawfully be made the object of an attack.  Further, 
as has also been noted, it is prohibited to engage in attacks where the 
primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population.99  
However, civilians may still be put in fear or influenced by attacks 
against legitimate military objectives.100 
The NATO bombing in Kosovo has prompted discussion about 
the Additional Protocol I definition of “military objective.”  A very 
narrow interpretation considers an attack on dual-use targets to be 
valid “only if they are actually (not potentially) used at the time for 
military purposes.”101  Since the military advantage must be assessed 
in the circumstances ruling at the time, “it is not legitimate to launch 
an attack which only offers potential or indeterminate advantages.”102  
This raises the issue of the difference between “use” and “purpose” 
of an object found in article 52(2).  A limitation on attacks to periods 
where property is actually being “used” seems narrower than the in-
 
States and international humanitarian law because of the growing inequity in precision targeting 
capability. 
 98. See Fenrick, supra note 88, at 497-498 (discussing the legality of certain measures taken 
to undermine civilian support). 
 99. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 5, at art. 51(2); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 11, 
at 116 (noting that “spreading terror among the civilian population is banned only when an at-
tack is conducted ‘for the specific purpose of producing this effect’”). 
 100. Fenrick, supra note 88, at 498; see also DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 116 (“There is no 
legal blemish in a ‘shock and awe’ air offensive . . . designed to pound military objections and 
break the back of the enemy armed forces.”). 
 101. Paolo Benvenuti, The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the NATO Bombing Cam-
paign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 12 EUR J. INT’L L. 503, 516 (2001); see also 
Sassoli, supra note 95, at 198 (A variation of this approach would “allow attacks on objects of a 
military nature even before they have an impact on military operations, while objects that are 
military because of their location purpose or use could only be attacked at the moment they 
provide an effective contribution. . . .”). 
 102. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Commentary, Additional Protocol I, art. 52, 
para. 2024, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
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terpretation of the “purpose” criteria in commentary by the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, which considers the intended fu-
ture use of an object.103  In this respect, “[m]ilitary purpose is deduced 
from an established intention of a belligerent as regards future use.”104  
In effect, the suggested narrow interpretation equates “purpose” with 
actual “use.”  An approach that relies on actual use appears to sug-
gest an “unless and for such time” test for targeting objects that is 
more appropriately considered for targeting persons.105  This narrow 
approach is also open to criticism to the extent it does not appear to 
account for the strategic component of warfare. 
A more expansive view of “military objectives” accepts that 
bridges and railway lines are military targets “if they are used for the 
purposes of military logistics which may have an impact on the out-
come of the conflict.”106  However, the argument has been made that 
the transportation infrastructure during the Kosovo conflict was not a 
valid target where there was no front and “[m]oving military supplies 
from one place to another had no significance whatsoever for the con-
flict where the declared tactic was to use bombing from great altitudes 
as the only means of causing damage to the enemy.”107  This interpre-
tation does not address the importance of logistics and freedom of 
movement to any enemy armed force, or recognize its vulnerability to 
asymmetric attack, regardless of the type of conflict.108  It has also 
been noted that a legitimate goal of the campaign was the removal of 
the Yugoslav military presence from the Kosovo region.109  Perhaps a 
more practical criterion to be used is one based on the likelihood of 
 
 103. Id. at para. 2022 (“The criterion of ‘purpose’ is concerned with the intended future use 
of an object, while that of ‘use’ is concerned with its present function.”). 
 104. DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 89. 
 105. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 5, at art. 51(3); see also MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., 
NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 324 (1982) (a direct connection to hostilities 
is not required for civilian objects under art. 52 in order for those objects to become valid mili-
tary objectives). 
 106. Michael Bothe, The Protection of the Civilian Population and NATO Bombing on 
Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 531, 534 (2001). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See ROBERT THOMPSON, DEFEATING COMMUNIST INSURGENCY: THE LESSONS OF 
MALAYA AND VIETNAM 31-34 (1966) (describing the importance of freedom of movement to 
insurgent forces). 
 109. See Peter Rowe, Kosovo 1999: The Air Campaign – Have the Provisions of Additional 
Protocol I Withstood the Test?, 82 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 147, 150 (2000) (“There can be little 
doubt that FRY military assets were, therefore, legitimate targets since their destruction etc. 
would offer a definite military advantage if their presence in Kosovo was ‘removed.’”). 
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military use being reasonable rather than “remote in the context of 
the particular conflict under way.”110 
It has been suggested that there is a “situation-dependant” as-
pect to the definition of many military objectives, with the strategic 
objectives of the parties and the degree to which the conflict ap-
proaches “total war” being factors for consideration. 111  A flexible ap-
proach to defining military objectives was rejected in The San Remo 
Manual, although the application of the same rules “to the facts 
should result in a more restrictive approach to targeting in limited 
conflicts.”112  The issue of whether strategic objectives of a conflict 
should impact on the definition of a “military objective” is an inter-
esting one.  It has been noted that in considering “an attack as a 
whole” that attack must be viewed as “a finite event, not to be con-
fused with the entire war.”113 
Suggestions that “military objectives” should assessed differently 
when an intervention has a “humanitarian” goal appear to introduce 
jus ad bellum principles into what has traditionally been reinforced as 
a uniquely jus in bello analysis.114  Similarly, relying on “total war” as a 
factor for defining military objectives presents a potential slippery 
slope of expansion that in the past has significantly endangered civil-
ians.  Consideration of broad strategic goals in assessing military ob-
jectives may, for most targeting decisions, be unnecessary.  The iden-
 
 110. Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus In Bello, 84 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 365, 385 (2002). 
 111. Fenrick, supra note 88, at 494. 
 112. THE SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 94, para. 40.8, at 116; see also Robertson, supra 
note 91, at 52 (discussing Additional Protocol I and the San Remo Manual’s approach to defin-
ing military objectives). 
 113. DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 87; see also Francoise J. Hampson, Means and Methods of 
Warfare in the Conflict in the Gulf, in THE GULF WAR 1990-91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
ENGLISH LAW 89, 94 (Peter Rowe ed. 1993) (explaining that the “direct military advantage an-
ticipated” means  “the advantage from ‘the attack considered as a whole,’” but that the “diffi-
culty of this is that the ultimate military advantage . . . could be held to justify a very high num-
ber of incidental civilian casualties”). 
 114. See Bothe, supra note 107, at 535 (questioning whether considerations of military ne-
cessity and advantage are different in a humanitarian conflict); Andreas Laursen, NATO, the 
War Over Kosovo, and the ICTY Investigation, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 765, 811 (2002) (dis-
cussing jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles in the context of the Kosovo conflict). The view 
that military necessity and military advantage might be different for “humanitarian” interven-
tions must be critically reviewed.  It will not take long for an opponent to take advantage of any 
interpretation which limits the effectiveness of military action simply because of what appears to 
be the introduction a just war like concept of “humanitarian” purpose.  See Sassoli, supra note 
95, at 199-200 (“The main difficulty of such approaches lies in defining the scope of application 
of such special rules compared to that of the normal rules and in abandoning the traditional 
equality of belligerents before IHL.”). 
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tification of “military objectives” will depend to a substantial degree 
on the capabilities of the opponent.  As has been noted, “[a]n airfield 
may be utilized for logistics purposes in one conflict, but serve no 
military function in another.”115  Regardless, the level of flexibility 
that attaches to defining military objectives through the fundamental 
characteristics of warfare cannot be forgotten.  Conflicts with “lim-
ited” strategic objectives can still be intense and involve significant 
levels of combat between well-equipped and supplied armed forces. 
The Canadian approach is reflected in its reservation to Addi-
tional Protocol I, which states “the military advantage anticipated 
from an attack is intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from 
the attack considered as a whole and not from isolated or particular 
parts of the attack.”116  This wording reflects the importance of con-
sidering the strategic impact of an attack.  It is broad enough to con-
sider that all of the bridges crossing a river may be destroyed even if 
the enemy “armed forces only require two to function effectively,”117 
as only the destruction of all bridges might yield a strategic military 
advantage to deny their use to the enemy forces.118  Further, the stra-
tegic nature of “military objectives” is found in the widespread ac-
knowledgment among legal scholars that dual use targets include tra-
ditional targets such as: rail yards, electrical power grids, oil 
refineries, lines of communications, war supporting industry, supply 
routes (including bridges) and communications integrated into the 
military command and control system.119 
 
 115. See Schmitt, supra note 111, at 384. 
 116. Canadian Declaration, supra note 68. 
 117. Fenrick, supra note 88, at 497. 
 118. See Rowe, supra note 110, at 152 (discussing the difficulty in deciding whether attacks 
on dual use targets yield a “military advantage”); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 93 
(“There is nothing wrong in a military policy striving to effect a fragmentation of enemy land 
forces through the destruction of all bridges – however minor in themselves – spanning a wide 
river.”). 
 119. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 103, at art. 52, n.3, for a list of mili-
tary objectives developed in 1956 as part of the Draft Rules for the Limitation of Dangers In-
curred by the Civilian Population in Time of War.  See also THE SAN REMO MANUAL, supra 
note 94, para. 40.11, at 117 (If the test under Additional Protocol I, art. 52(2) is met, “military 
objectives” include “activities providing administrative and logistical support to military opera-
tions such as transportation and communications systems, railroads, airfields and port facilities 
and industries of fundamental importance for the conduct of the armed conflict.”); LESLIE C. 
GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 191 (2d ed. 2000) (noting that ac-
cepted military objectives include “economic targets that indirectly but effectively support en-
emy operations”) ; DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 87-94 (discussing the definition of military objec-
tives by their nature, location, purpose and use); but see Benvenuti, supra note 102, at 515-16 
(criticizing the use of the ICRC Draft Rules). 
WATKIN1.DOC 9/15/2005  10:11 AM 
308 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 15:281 
C. Degrees of Difference? 
It has been suggested that the difference between Additional 
Protocol I and the “war-fighting or war-sustaining” wording adopted 
by the United States is actually not that great.  There appears to be a 
general acceptance that an attack on an objective which is only indi-
rectly related to combat action, but which provides an effective con-
tribution to the military part of an opposing party’s war effort, is law-
ful,120 with a primary point of difference “being in respect to attacks 
on exports that may be the sole or principal source of financial re-
sources for a belligerent’s continuation of its war effort.”121  However, 
the “war-sustaining” wording has been criticized as being “too lax” 
and introducing a slippery-slope concept in the context of exports 
where every economic activity “might be construed by the enemy as 
indirectly sustaining the war effort. . . .”122 
All being said, there is significant similarity in national ap-
proaches towards classifying “military objectives.”  The Canadian ap-
proach of looking at the effect of the attack as a whole is broad 
enough to include as military objectives targets which indirectly make 
an effective contribution to an opposing party’s military war effort.  
As a result, there should be no insurmountable impediment to Cana-
dian and American participation in coalition operations, although 
there could be disagreements regarding specific targeting decisions.123 
 
 120. See Robertson, supra note 91, at 47-52 (considering what constitutes a legitimate mili-
tary objective); see also GREEN, supra note 120, at 191 (“Civilian vessels, aircraft, vehicles and 
buildings are also legitimate targets if they contain combatant personnel or military equipment 
or supplies. . . .”); THE SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 94, para. 40.12, at 117 (“[A] civilian 
object may become a military objective and thereby lose its immunity from deliberate attack 
through use which is only indirectly related to combat action, but which nevertheless provides 
an effective contribution to the military part of a party’s overall war-fighting capability.”).  
However, see Sassoli, supra note 95, at 186, for a rejection of an interpretation that includes 
“indirect contribution and possible advantages.” 
 121. Id. at 210-11. 
 122. DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 87 (“For an object to qualify as a military objective, there 
must exist a proximate nexus to military action (or ‘war-fighting’).”); see also Fritz Kalshoven, A 
Comment to Chapter 11 of the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 64 
INT’L L. STUD. 300, 310 (1991) (“To add ‘war-sustaining effort’ is going too far, however, as this 
might easily be interpreted to encompass virtually every activity in the enemy country.”). 
 123. See Lieutenant General Michael Short, USAF (Ret), Operation Allied Force from the 
Perspective of the NATO Air Commander, 78 INT’L L. STUD. 19, 24-26 (2002) (discussing the 
challenges presented to a military commander in Coalition operations where separate national 
decisions are being made on what constitutes a valid target). 
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V.  CONTEMPORARY DEBATE:  
THE TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS. 
The final humanitarian law issue to be explored is the targeting 
of “individuals.”  Closely linked to the question of identifying “mili-
tary objects,” this is an area of the law which is only now receiving 
significant scrutiny.124  The increased technological capability of both 
military forces and non-state actors has thrust the issue of targeting 
individuals into the limelight.  Contemporary examples, such as the 
targeting of Saddam Hussein at the commencement of the 2003 Iraq 
conflict125 and the killing of Al Qaeda terrorists in Yemen126 in 2002, 
stand out as examples of a further, and in many respects controver-
sial, expansion of the contemporary battlefield that started with the 
introduction of aerial warfare in the 20th century.  However, as was 
evidenced by the reported use of unmanned aerial vehicles by the 
Hezbollah in Lebanon in late 2004, access to the technology under-
pinning this capability does not appear to be limited to nation 
states.127  Certainly the question of targeting non-state actors remains 
a controversial aspect of the complicated legal situation in the Occu-
pied Territories.128 
A. Targeted Killing 
Targeted killing is an integral part of warfare.  Here it must be 
distinguished from assassination in peacetime, which is recognized as 
a form of terrorism.129  While the right to life is a deeply valued con-
 
 124. See, e.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law (Jan. 9, 2003), available at  http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/ 
siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_reaffirmation_and_development?OpenDocument (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2005) (providing a summary of the “direct participation” debate). 
 125. Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Thomas E. Ricks, U.S. Opens War With Strikes on Baghdad 
Aimed at Hussein, WASH. POST., March 20, 2003, at A-1. 
 126. David Johnston & David E. Sanger, Fatal Strike in Yemen Was Based on Rules Set out 
by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at A16. 
 127. Hezbollah Drone Flies over Israel, BBC NEWS, WORLD EDITION, Nov. 7, 2004, avail-
able at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3990773.stm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
 128. For a discussion of the Israeli policy of targeted killing, see J. Nicholas Kendall, Israeli 
Counter-Terrorism: “Targeted Killings” Under International Law, 80 N.C.L. REV. 1069 (2002); 
and Orna Ben-Naftali and Keren R. Michaeli, ‘We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law’: A 
Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 233 (2003). 
 129. “Assassination” in peace time is a form of terrorism.  As such it is commonly viewed as 
a murder for political purposes.  In warfare most killing is for a political purpose.  During armed 
conflict “assassination” is linked to treachery rather than the political aspect of the killing.  Mi-
chael N. Schmitt, State Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law, 17 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 609, 639-42 (1992). 
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cept in peace and war, the lex specialis of international humanitarian 
law recognizes the non-culpable homicide of members of an opposing 
force during armed conflict.130  Lawful combatants may be targeted 
regardless of whether they are unarmed or out of uniform as long as 
they are not hors de combat.131  Further, such targeting is not tempo-
rally limited, with combatants being valid targets even when they are 
in retreat or not posing an immediate threat to the attacking armed 
force.132  The legal framework governing the targeting and therefore 
the protection of uninvolved civilians is on its face more complicated.  
Article 51 of Additional Protocol I states that civilians “shall not be 
made the object of attack.”133  They enjoy that protection “unless and 
for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”134 
While civilians have long had a varying degree of association 
with military forces and operations,135 it is the determination of when 
persons without lawful combatant status take a direct or active part in 
hostilities which challenges practitioners and legal scholars alike.  The 
participation of persons not having a claim to lawful combatant status 
is not a new phenomenon.136  However, the contemporary “War on 
Terror,” situations of occupation and the proliferation of non-
international armed conflicts have focused attention on the targeting 
of non-state actors.  The targeting challenge arises from a confluence 
of factors such as the integration of opposing forces within the civilian 
population; a lack of visible distinguishing characteristics for irregular 
forces such as the wearing of uniforms; and the often overlapping in-
terface between humanitarian law and human rights-based law en-
 
 130. Watkin, supra note 4, at 9-10. 
 131. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, 2004 I.C.T.Y. 11 (July 29, 2004), Case No. IT-95-14-A, para. 
114, available at http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/appeal/judgement/bla-aj040729e.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2005) (“If [the victim] is indeed a member of an armed organization, the fact that he is 
not armed or in combat at the time of the commission of crimes, does not accord him civilian 
status.”). 
 132. See Yoram Dinstein, Legitimate Military Objectives Under the Current Jus in Bello, 78 
INT’L L. STUD. 139, 153 (2002) (arguing that the contention “when an army has been routed . . . 
they should not be further attacked” is a “serious misconception”). 
 133. Additional Protocol I, supra note 5, at art. 51(2). 
 134. Id. at art. 51(3). 
 135. For example, persons integrated into or supporting the military structure; civilian lead-
ers directing military organizations; participants in a nation’s war effort, such as factory workers; 
law enforcement, para-military and other government agencies; and other armed individuals or 
groups present in the battle space.  See Watkin, supra note 85, at 91-94 (discussing civilian inte-
gration into, and support of, the military). 
 136. See, e.g., Lester Nurick & Roger W. Barrett, Legality of Guerrilla Forces Under the 
Laws of War, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 563, 570-82 (1946) (reviewing historical precedent for the status 
of guerilla forces under international law). 
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forcement normative frameworks governing the use of force in such 
complex operational situations.137 
B. Direct Participation and Combatancy 
A particular challenge arises in the requirement to identify what 
constitutes “direct participation” and what is meant by the wording 
“unless and for such time” set out in article 51(3) of Additional Pro-
tocol I.  Dealing first with the identification of individuals who can be 
targeted, it has been noted that persons associated with a terrorist or-
ganization can include the killers, superiors who order the act, col-
leagues who facilitate it, trainers, colleagues offering general encour-
agement without actual knowledge and persons who disapprove of 
terrorism but who participate in other activities of the organization.138  
In addition, “[o]utside the organization there may be donors and sup-
porters of different kinds.”139  Clearly not all of these individuals are 
part of the fighting organization and therefore not all can be targeted. 
An area of controversy has been whether a terrorist or other 
non-state actor must have a weapon in their hand in order to be tar-
geted.140  This appears reflective of a human rights-based approach us-
ing force, and unfortunately, does not address the group nature of 
participation in hostilities and the greater level of violence associated 
with armed conflict.  In that regard, participation in combat is inher-
ently a group activity with combat functions such as fighters, com-
manders, planners, intelligence gatherers and logistics personnel be-
ing carried out by members of the group.141  Non-state fighting 
 
 137. See Watkin, supra note 4, at 24-30 (discussing the “direct interface” between humani-
tarian law and human rights law). 
 138. Neuman, supra note 70, at 289. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, Expert Opinion On Whether Israel’s Targeted Killings of 
Palestinian Terrorists is Consonant with International Humanitarian Law, at 8, at 
http://www.stop torture.org.il/eng/images/uploaded/publications/64.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 
2005) (offering an opinion for The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel on the targeting 
of those suspected to be engaged in an attack); AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INT’L REPORT, 
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: STATE ASSASSINATIONS AND OTHER UNLAWFUL 
KILLINGS 29 (Feb. 2001), available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/Index/MDE150052001ENGLISH/$File/MDE150050
1.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (discussing whether Palestinians engaged in hostilities can be 
targeted). 
 141. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 103,  para. 1695 n.35, at art. 44 (quot-
ing F.A. von der Heydte,  2 ANNUALIRE IDI 56 (1969)) (noting that unarmed combatants can 
act by “carrying out reconnaissance missions, transmitting information, maintaining communi-
cations and transmissions, supplying guerrilla forces with arms and food, hiding guerrilla 
forces. . .”). 
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organizations, whether lawful participants in hostilities or otherwise, 
have long taken on these attributes of military organizations.142  In-
deed, non-state and terrorist organizations may be divided into politi-
cal and military wings,143 although it has been noted that it is often dif-
ficult to separate the activities of the two segments.144 
The attempts to limit the exposure of civilians to the risk of being 
targeted to the time when they have weapons in their hands has in-
troduced concerns about a “revolving door” of protection for unlaw-
ful combatants. 145  This in turn raises a question concerning the nature 
of the limitation found in the wording of article 51(3) of Additional 
Protocol I, that “[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection [from being the 
object of an attack], unless and for such time as they take a direct part 
in hostilities.”146 
However, adopting a policy where a state would have to wait 
while the next attack is being planned and organized could erode 
rather than strengthen the credibility of humanitarian law.147  A strong 
 
 142. See, e.g., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 25, at 365-66 (indicating complex 
international terrorist operations require planning and staff work, a command structure, recruit-
ing, training, a logistics network, access to weapons, reliable communications and an opportu-
nity to test the plan); see also ROGER TRINQUIER, MODERN WARFARE 10-15 (1964) (identifica-
tion a simple bomb-throwing network consisting of a “body-maker”, explosives expert, delivery 
team and “bomb-placers”).  Similarly, traditional insurgency groups organize along military 
lines.  See FRANK KITSON, LOW INTENSITY OPERATIONS 39-40 (1971) (discussing the growth of 
a guerrilla movement into regular units); MAO TSE-TUNG, ON GUERRILLA WARFARE 71-87, 
Appendices 1-4. (Samuel B. Griffith II trans. 2000) (1961) (outline of guerrilla warfare organiza-
tions ranging from the “people” to Regimental level). 
 143. See G. DAVIDSON SMITH, COMBATING TERRORISM 17-20 (1990) (outlining the matu-
ration of the political and military structures of insurgent groups over time); W. Hays Parks, 
Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination, ARMY LAW. 4, 7 (1989) 
(“Guerrilla warfare is particularly difficult to address because a guerrilla organization generally 
is divided into political and guerrilla (military) cadre. . . .”). 
 144. See JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD: WHY RELIGIOUS MILITANTS 
KILL 48 (2003) (describing the difficulty in discerning the difference between Hamas’ political 
and military wings); WALZER, supra note 52, at 139 (“With terrorist organizations, this distinc-
tion between military and political leaders probably collapses.”). 
 145. See Major Lisa L. Turner & Major Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 
A.F.L. REV. 1, 28 (2001) (explaining that attempts to limit civilian exposure mean that “a civil-
ian who is a valid military target while he is planning or executing an attack becomes immune 
from attack once he is not involved in planning another attack, even if he will become involved 
in the conflict later”); Parks, supra note 6, at 118-20 (noting that an “initial problem with estab-
lishment of combatant or civilian status lies in the new revolving door provided for by Protocol I 
for certain ‘civilians. . . .’”). 
 146. Additional Protocol I, supra note 5, at art. 51(3). 
 147. See Kenneth Watkin, Humans in the Cross-Hairs: Targeting, Assassination and 
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argument can be made that members of a terrorist organization in-
volved in an armed conflict should remain at risk of being targeted as 
long as they act as “combatants” (albeit without lawful status).  Their 
status as “unprivileged belligerents” would be determined by the par-
ticipation of their group in an armed conflict and the “function” that 
the individuals perform within the organization.  This could include 
applying the basic military staff structure (personnel, intelligence, op-
erations, logistics, civil-military relations, communications, etc.) to a 
non-state fighting organization as a form of template to identify 
where individual participants might fit.148  Mere financial donors or 
those providing moral support would not be targeted (although they 
may be arrested), but members of the organization employed in sup-
plying weapons and or carrying out intelligence activities could be at-
tacked.149  These participants in hostilities could regain the protection 
afforded in article 51 of Additional Protocol I by becoming hors de 
combat or by taking concrete steps such as surrendering.150 
C. The Future 
The question to be resolved regarding Canadian and United 
States coalition operations is where each nation will draw the lines for 
identifying direct participation in hostilities.  There could very well be 
differences in approach.  Many of these issues, such as determining 
when civilians accompany the armed forces participating in hostilities 
and the involvement of civilian leaders in making targeting decisions, 
are difficult to resolve in the context of contemporary armed con-
flict.151  Interpretations of international humanitarian law must realis-
tically address the threats posed by the opposing force.  This would 
include not only the hands-on killers but also those who perform 
command and support functions similar to those carried out by uni-
formed personnel in regular armed forces.  It has been noted, “it 
would seem odd to say that it is legitimate to attack a group of terror-
ists-in-training in a camp in Afghanistan, say, but not legitimate to go 
 
Extra-Legal Killing in Contemporary Armed Conflict, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING 
THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 167 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangel-
ista eds., 2004). 
 148. Watkin, supra note 148, at 153-54.  See also U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY MANUAL 
FM 101-5, STAFF ORGANIZATIONS AND OPERATIONS 2-2, 2-3 (May 31, 1997) (describing the 
basic staff structure model). 
 149. Watkin, supra note 148, at 153-54. 
 150. DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 28. 
 151. See Watkin, supra note 148, at 163-65. 
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after the man who is planning the operation for which the others are 
training.  That can’t be right.”152 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Canada and the United States are committed by geography and 
history to act together, both in mutual defence and as part of broader 
multilateral operations on the world stage.  Our mutual commitment 
to the Rule of Law means that each country will be guided by its in-
ternational legal obligations, but will also be affected by national in-
terpretations of those laws.  However, this review of legal issues, such 
as the use of anti-personnel mines, combating of terrorism, identifica-
tion of military objectives and use of targeted killing indicates that 
differences in approach ranging from substantive to potential should 
not act as an impediment to effective bilateral and multilateral opera-
tions. 
This does not mean that there will be no differences in approach.  
However, in terms of the conduct of operations, our nations have op-
erated, and will continue to operate, very effectively together under 
the normative framework of humanitarian law.  As Canadian Prime 
Minister Paul Martin noted on December 1, 2004, “[w]e are in a war 
against terrorism and we are in it together, Americans and Canadi-
ans.”153 
 
 152. WALZER, supra note 52, at 140. 
 153. Bush in Halifax: ‘Thank you for your kindness,’ CANADIAN BROADCASTING 
CORPORATION NEWS (Dec. 1, 2004), available at 
http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2004/12/01/bush-halifax-advance041201.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 28, 2005). 
